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Utility workers at blast site in San Bruno on Sept. 13

Officials said today they plan to push for state legislation that requires gas utilities to install automatic shutoff valves on their transmission lines. 

The pipeline that exploded last week in San Bruno had manual shutoff valves that responders were not able to access until about one hour and 45 minutes after the explosion, PG&E said. The company said the valves, which are located between a mile and a mile and a half from the explosion site, were too dangerous to access at the time of the blast.

“[The valves] should be able to be remotely activated from someplace other than where the disaster or tragedy is,” Assemblymember Jerry Hill said. “That's something we should look at statewide.”

Residents have expressed anger over the length of time it took responders to stop the flow of gas. Automatic valves, which can be accessed off-site, are not required by law. PG&E said it does not have automatic valves in place because the company cannot afford them.

“We had a manual valve, which is an acceptable solution to control the pipe,” said Edward Salas, senior vice president of engineering and operations.  “We’re going to evaluate the wisdom on that as we get advice and feedback from the investigative team.”

The San Bruno blast is not the first time questions have been raised about PG&E response to an emergency that required shutting off gas valves.

In 1981, a 16-inch natural gas main in San Francisco's financial district was punctured by a drill, causing natural gas laced with toxic polychlorinated biphenyl to spew over eight square blocks.

An investigation by the NTSB found that PG&E employees first responding to the site were not trained how to close the line’s valves and were not equipped with wrenches needed to do so. Some of the valves were not listed in company records and thus not regularly inspected. As a result, one valve had been paved over and was inaccessible. In addition, two valves were not shown on emergency diagrams.

A letter issued by the NTSB in April 1982 to then-PG&E president B.W. Shakelford stated, “What should have been an orderly, preplanned shutdown because of PG&E’s preplanning efforts became an impromptu situation and required hurried reviews of ESD’s and other company records.”

Chris Hart, vice chair of National Transportation Safety Board, said the agency will investigate whether automatic shutoff valves were needed for the pipes in last week’s explosion, and whether the utility company had continued to comply with recommendations the agency made in 1982 after their investigation of the downtown pipeline explosion.

Those recommendations included training first responders how to shut off the valves and requiring employees to regularly exercise the valves to ensure they continue to work. The NTSB says it does not check back on compliance after a company adopts recommendations.

“PG&E responded to those recommendations back in 1982. They made them and took care of it back then,” Hart said at a public meeting hosted by Rep. Jackie Speier Monday night at the Church of the Highlands.

Regardless of responders' actions, officials and residents say automatic valves could have cut the flow of gas sooner, mitigating the damage.

“It would seem to me that having automatic shutoff valves on transmission lines would make a lot of sense,” Speier said.

Agreements resounded through the room, and one resident said, “A no-brainer."